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ABSTRACT 
 
???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??i-
cations of this accountability and that voters in this African country do evaluate their political lead-
ers not only on personal and clientelistic goods but also on provision of small and large-scale col-
lective goods. In effect and without necessarily thinking of it this way, citizens in Ghana are de-
manding greater impartiality not only from the bureaucracy in its implementation of public policy, 
but also from legislators and they use the electoral mechanism to achieve it. MPs in Ghana clearly 
differ in how much they provide quality of government as impartiality. It is also clear that voters in 
this country see the difference and put some value on impartially provided goods. To what extent 
pressures from voters will induce politicians in new democracies such as Ghana to further increase 
the quality of government rather than the provision of partially distributed personal and clientelistic 
goods remains to be established by future research. 
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Rothstein and Teorell suggest impartiality as the inherent meaning of quality of government. Their 
compelling argument extends on Rothstein and Teorell (2008) and Teorell (2009) where the core 
conceptual meaning (Adcock and Collier 2001, Sartori 1984) of impartiality is captured by the 
statement ? ???? ????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????????????? ?????????? ????? ????? ???????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Rothstein and Teorell 2008, 
170;; see also Teorell 2009, 13). This paper ????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????a-
tion makes a lot of intuitive sense, a tribulation is the lack of attention to that quality of government 
is not only a matter of bureaucratic impartiality. Bad quality of government does not only arise 
from dysfunctionalities on the implementation side of politics and in the administrative arm of the 
state. It can also grow out of electoral mechanisms on the input side, and from politicians, not civil 
servants, acting with too much discretion in distributive politics. Secondly, and as Rothstein (2011, 
15) stresses, the problem of bad quality of government is not only, or perhaps not even primarily, 
about corruption. The main issue is better thought of as favoritism, which is a broader phenome-
non including most types of corruption but also many acts that are not corruption per see. This 
chapter contribution is principally to demonstrate these two points. 
 
Legislators and (low) quality of government 
In many countries, including in most developing nations, politicians play a decisive role not only by 
shaping whether policy treats citizens equally. Elected representatives at both local and national 
level are often directly responsible for governing implementation of government policies and de 
facto for important aspects of distributive politics. Added to this is expectation to perform constit-
uency service in single-member district-based electoral systems.1 In its various forms, constituency 
service often compromises the principle of impartiality and constitutes favoritism to various de-
grees. When a legislator convinces the executive to allocate greater educational, health, or invest-
ment resources to that particular district outside the general principles of policy, it undermines the 
general principle of treating all citizens equally although the benefits accrue to all inhabitants of that 
                                                     
1 The extension of the law-like consequences of electoral systems first developed by Duverger (1954) and Downs 
(1957) have been testified by the work of scholars like Bogaards (2000), Bogdanor and Butler (1983), Lijphart 1984, 
1994, 1999), Lijphart and Waisman 1996), Lindberg (2005), Mair (1990), Powell (1982, 2000), Rae (1971), Reynolds 
and Sisk (1998), and Sartori (1968, 1986, 1997, 2001). 
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constituency favoring some over others not based on a general rule but based on discretionary 
power even if it benefits a relatively large group.  
However, there are also more narrowly defined, idiosyncratic, and hence even more adverse forms 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
school or clinic for one community, tarring of a local road, digging of wells in one place rather than 
????????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ??????? ?????? ???? ???? ????????? ??? ?? ?????-specific job-package, are 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n-
telism proper in the form of individual benefits (private goods). This is the gravest form of favorit-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
impartiality. Private goods can come in the form of diverse things such as cash, a bag of rice, a job, 
roofing sheets, payment of hospital bills and schools fees, and assistance with the police or other 
parts of the bureaucracy. The last issue may be particularly damaging in some countries by com-
promising the functioning of bureaucracies even if the staff there are honestly trying to provide 
good quality of government. In whatever form, the targeted collective, club, and private goods are 
typically exchanged for some kind of political loyalty and therefore useful to politicians in the short 
term but detrimental to society and the state in the longer term when extensive and occurring re-
peatedly.  
This reasoning leads us to expect that legislators in new democracies, particularly those with single-
member constituencies, play a role in shaping the quality of government. This chapter proposes a 
new way of measuring the extent to which legislators (in this context Members of Parliament, or 
MPs) compromises impartiality by engaging in favoritism (without it necessarily being corruption) 
and thus affect the quality of government. It analyses the pattern of behavior of a strategically select 
number of MPs ??? ??????????????????????????????????????? 
The results show significant variation in levels of favoritism. MPs in Ghana clearly differ in how 
much they provide quality of government as impartiality. To what extent pressures from voters will 
further induce politicians in new democracies such as Ghana to increase the quality of government 
rather than the provision of partially distributed personal and clientelistic goods remains to be es-
tablished by future research. Besides the implications for the quality of government, this variation 
within one and the same country, is a finding that runs contrary to much of the established litera-
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ture on African politics. A significant share of the incumbent MPs prioritizes provision of collective 
and club goods rather than more pure favoritism.  
 
Legislators in New Democracies 
Let me start with an observation on the empirical context in which this study of Ghana is situated. 
For some observers, the experiments with multiparty elections since the early 1990s did not 
changed the fundamentals of African politics. It was ???????????????????????????? ???????? ??? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??????????????? ????????????? ??????? ???? ???? ????? ???????????? ????????????????????? ????????
while Cowen and Laakso (2002, 14-???????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
never before has virtually all countries in Africa held regular multiparty (if not democratic) elections 
over such an extended period of time (e.g. Lindberg 2006), and never before has so many presi-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Young 2007).  Even in places like the Republic of Congo, Mauritania, and Madagascar where the 
military has intervened in politics, multi???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
countries are now democracies and many of the rest are generally more democratic today than ever 
before. By implication, there is a body of politicians with more impact on the quality of govern-
ment than ever before: the legislators. 
The official role of legislators is typically viewed as to supply collective and public goods, such as 
executive oversight, or the scrutiny of legislation, or the making of public policy, or constituency 
representation ? in short, the kind of roles with which legislators are most closely associated in the 
established democracies. In the eyes of many observers, part of the problem of African politics is 
that politicians spend too much time grabbing private rewards in the form of jobs, contracts, and 
kick-backs to sustain clientelistic networks, and too little time supplying public goods, or even club 
goods (e.g. constituency service). The conventional wisdom is that in most African countries, in-
formal pressures to provide private goods take precedence over public and collective goods provi-
sion for politicians and bureaucrats alike. The role of the African politician as depicted in much of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????and private 
goods to supporters, the former by means of formal or informal relations with government minis-
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tries and external donors, the latter by means of informal, sometimes illicit, sometimes ethnic, per-
sonalized and clientelistic networks. 
While there is just emerging a small literature on legislatures and legislators (e.g. Barkan 2009), it 
seems clear that in their day-to-day roles MPs face a variety of formal and informal institutional 
pressures to supply public, collective, as well as private goods. ????????????? ???????????? ?????????
recent explorative research in Ghana (Lindberg 2009a, 2009b, 2010;; Weghorst & Lindberg 2009), 
suggests that MPs are subject to very strong contradictory pressures to supply both collective and 
private goods. These pressures take the form of powerful informal institutional expectations about 
???? ????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???? ????????? ??????? ????????????? ??????????? ???? ???????
overnight.  
Pressures and the strategic situation for candidates varies, for example with the level of competi-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the electorate in the national polls. Rather, the pivotal events are the primary elections. In Ghana to 
date, only party constituency executives and party polling station executives have been allowed to 
take part in primaries and this group consists of around one hundred individuals per constituency. 
Hence, we would expect candidates to be held accountable much more closely by the local party 
executives than by ordinary people in these areas. For candidates from the dominant party, the 
following election campaigns are more or less exclusively about mobilization: that is, bringing out 
????????????????????????????????????????????????2 Candidates can be relatively sure (with a probability 
equal to the percentage of votes the party normally receives in that area) that an individual voter is 
going to vote for them and their presidential candidate if the voter just makes the effort to go to 
the polls. Hence, there is less need for either individualized, that is highly targeted and thus private 
goods through clientelistic networks, or for monitoring and other enforcement activities. Club 
goods for the communities and/or collective goods for the constituency should therefore be a pre-
ferred electoral strategy. 
The situation is different in a highly contested constituency in conditions of general poverty as is 
the case in much of Africa. While communities within such constituencies that are strongholds for 
                                                     
2 The extent to which safe havens exist in African countries varies widely both between countries and between different 
regions in the same country, as do turnout rates in general. In some countries mobilization is a major issue in virtually all 
constituencies (e.g. Mali with an average turnout in national elections typically hovering around 30 %), but on average 
turnout has been relatively high (67% in elections judged to be credible by international and local elections observers) in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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a specific candidate may be treated in much the same way as safe havens, most areas are not. In a 
contested constituency competition typically centers on the swing voter. Candidates will seek to 
identify potential swing voters and their preferences to be able to target clientelistic, private goods 
to them in ways that make monitoring and enforcement possible. This of course creates significant 
demands on candidates in terms of organization but they have little choice given relatively limited 
financial assets. Whatever little they have available must be targeted in the most efficient way possi-
ble. Everything being equal, we would expect a higher incidence of clientelistic practices in contest-
ed constituencies where the outcome of the election is unknown.  
Not enough is known about how effectively MPs manage the different demands of formal and 
informal institutions, or about the circumstances  that lead to better outcomes in terms of the quali-
ty of government. Yet, before a cause and effect analysis is possible, one must effectively map out 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
regard, we still know very little. This chapter advances our knowledge regarding how much of pri-
vate, collective and public goods MPs actually provide ? in the eyes of their constituents.  
 
Measuring Impartiality among MPs 
While views on the proper role of the legislator may vary, from the point of view of impartiality the 
preferred situation is arguably one in which MPs focus most of their time, energy and resource on 
the provision of public, and to some extent collective goods rather than on distribution of club and 
in particular private goods in clientelistic networks. The question is if there is meaningful variation 
between MPs in new democracies in this respect and, if so, whether this can be measured systemat-
ically and in a reliable fashion. Unless these two conditions are fulfilled, the next step of assessing 
which factors promote the preferred situation is effectively impossible. My limited empirical goal is 
to first suggest a method and then show the results of a measurement strategy relying on survey 
responses that could in principle be replicated anywhere. How much of various types of goods do 
MPs in fact supply? I???????????????????????????????????? ????? ??????????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
their constituencies as reported in survey responses. This method is far from perfect but nonethe-
less has some advantages. Indicators of actual behavior would be the most preferred measure but 
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for practical purposes it is not feasible. Activities of executive oversight, for example, are mostly 
not recorded in any formal sense in new democracies apart from questions on the floor of the 
house. Certain committees (including the public accounts committee) may have begun to play an 
important role in oversight in Ghana as increasingly in other new democracies and a systematic 
???????????????????????????????????????tions to those could potentially be conducted. Access to 
closed committee meetings would be an issue however, and even if not, there would be a substan-
????? ????? ????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????f-
forts such as visits to ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) are not documented in any 
systematic fashion;; neither are constituency-level inspections of ongoing projects and activities that 
is part of executive oversight.  
Legislative activities are equally shrouded in obscurity in many new democracies. Beyond the at-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
debates, the activities (or lack thereof) of individual MPs in the legislative process are typically not 
registered. When it comes to constituency service, as well as taking care of constituents in their role 
?????????????????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ??????????
2010), there are virtually no indicators that could even function as proxies. Hence, a behavioral 
approach would necessitate recording of primary data by way of effectively shadowing individual 
legislators from morning to night over a given period. Even if this is doable in principle, it would 
be prohibitively expensive, methodologically questionable, and hence not feasible in more than a 
very limited number of cases. 
As part of a larger project and in order to create a dataset for further analysis of MPs-citizens ac-
countability relationships, ten out of G???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????y-
???????????????????????????????????????????3 Ghana is a presidential democracy with single-member 
constituencies and single plurality rules for elections to legislative office, and has a stable two-party 
system. There are a few smaller parties that usually win two to four seats. The ten constituencies 
were selected based on a number of variables that we expect to be important in terms of represent-
ativeness as well as for variation on the dependent variable. I cannot claim that the selected constit-
uencies are representative of the total universe of 230 constituencies, but as evidenced by earlier 
                                                     
3 For further discussion of the methodology used for the selection of the constituencies, including considerations of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????(2005, 2008) and Weghorst and Lindberg 2011. 
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research (Lindberg and Morrison 2005, 2009) these ten constituencies capture much, if not all, of 
the variation in terms of citizens- representative accountability relationships.  
The sampling procedure involved first stratifying constituencies in the 2008 elections by Ghana's 
ten regions. Then, since a computer generated, random selection procedure could lead to selection 
of extreme outliers, one constituency was strategically selected from each of the ten regions by 
weighting a number of both quantitative and qualitative indicators in order to ensure a representa-
tive selection of constituencies as far as possible. The ten constituencies were divided approximate-
ly equally between incumbents from each of the two main parties. For each of the main parties, we 
also selected one safe haven constituency, defined as one in which the party has consistently won 
70 percent of the votes or more in the elections since 19964 as well as constituencies that used to be 
close to safe havens but have become swing constituencies. We also wanted to sample the behavior 
of the largest minor party, also representing a long-standing northern tradition in Ghanaian politics. 
In making these selections we made a conscious effort also to get as much geographical variation as 
possible, as well as a rural-urban spread and ethno-linguistic representation. Once the ten constitu-
encies were, a random sample of potential voters (everyone above the age of 18) was drawn using a 
two-stage procedure following the Afrobarometer Survey Methods (2009). This generated a sample 
of 160 respondents in each constituency and a total sample of 1,600 potential voters. 
Performance of the MPs in terms of quality of government was measured using a battery of ques-
tions where citizens were asked to evaluate the incumbent MP in their constituency. The perfor-
mance in terms of collective goods was measured with two questions: one asking how well, or how 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
???? ?????????????? ???? ???? ?????? ????????? ??????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ???????????? ????????????
?? ???????????????????????????). Club goods performance was measured by a question asking how 
well or how badly the respondents thought the incumbent had done over the past years in terms of 
????????????? ???????? ????????????? ?????????? ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ????? 
performance was measure by a question asking how well or badly the incumbent had done in terms 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????culation of constituency means as well as 
percentages, rating the incumbent in terms of the bad/very bad, or well/very well ratings and pro-
                                                     
4 The first legislative election in November 1992 was boycotted by the opposition after disagreements over the fairness 
of the presidential elections held earlier the same year. 
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ducing rankings out of these measures (as displayed in Table 1), is relatively straightforward.5 The 
ordering of the constituencies are done by rank order on provision of collective goods. 
 
Table 1 presents a both surprising and predictable picture. It is surprising both that we find that 
some MPs are at least perceived to provide substantial amounts of collective goods and that there is 
such a variation across the measures, given the prevailing consensus on clientelistic strategies in the 
literature on African politics. It is predictable that MPs who are investing more heavily in collective 
goods provision (targeting larger groups of individuals) spend less on provision for small groups 
                                                     
5 Each measure runs from 0 to 5 with 2 as the midpoint. The rank ordering is self-explanatory. Average ratings clearly 
??????????????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Table 1: M??? performance in selected constituencies 
  Collective Goods  Club Goods  Private Goods 
  Performance Rank Category  Performance Rank Category  Performance Rank Category 
Constituency Type (0=Low) (1=High)  
 
(0=Low) (1=High)  
 
(0=Low) (1=High)  
Tamale  C   Intermed.   2.81   1   High      2.48   1   High      2.15   2   High  
 N (.082)            (.110)            (.119)        
Ho  West   Safe   2.67   2   High      2.36   3   High      2.08   3   Medium 
 N (.061)            (.095)            (.114)        
Kwabre  East   Safe   2.41   3   High      1.86   5   Medium    1.88   6   Medium 
 N (.071)            (.110)            (.113)        
Bolgatanga   Contested   2.52   4   High      2.43   2   High      2.59   1   High  
 N (.084)            (.094)            (.092)        
Jaman  S   Intermed.   2.32   5   High      2.04   4   Medium    1.93   4   Medium 
 N (.056)            (.074)            (.079)        
Akim  Swedru   Safe   2.04   6   Medium    1.60   8   Low    1.14   10   Low 
 N (.086)            (.104)            (.105)        
Evalue-­G.   Intermed.   1.78   7   Low    1.29   9   Low    1.21   9   Low 
 N (.085)            (.107)            (.104)        
Ablekumah  S   Contested   1.97   8   Low    1.83   6   Medium    1.61   7   Low 
  (.096)            (.108)            (.129)        
Kpone/Kat   Intermed.   1.88   9   Low    1.62   7   Low    1.91   5   Medium 
 N (.106)            (.116)            (.122)        
Cape  Coast   Contested   1.57   10   Low    1.20   10   Low    1.22   8   Low 
 N (.092)            (.111)            (.117)        
   Total   2.20            1.87            1.76        
 N 1343    1,502    1,260      
Chi2/Anova-­F   25.15            19.83         .
9  
19.99  
 p .000    .000    .000      
*  Calculated  as  means  of  performance  along  the  2  public    goods  dimensions  if  missing  values  are  1  or  0;;  analyzed  using  Anova;;  values  in  brackets  
are  standard  errors;;  significance  is  F-­value.  
Source:  Author?s  survey  data  2008  
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and especially individual benefits. They may either be forced to do this given limited resources, or 
just decide to pursue a different strategy. But the picture is still incomplete without accounting for 
clientelism proper. 
Measuring and producing an equivalent measure of clientelism is a little more tricky. Clientelism is a 
socially less acceptable practice and there is a risk of underreporting. It is also uncertain which indi-
cators more truthfully measure it. Rather than arguing for one particular indicator as better than 
others, it seems reasonable to accept that political clientelism can take different forms for different 
individuals. The objective here is to find a reasonable way of comparing the pervasiveness of clien-
telism in different parts of Ghana, and in constituencies with different levels of competition. 
The survey included a series of indirect and direct questions about the present state of clientelistic 
practices as well as comparisons with previous elections.6 After extensive analysis and comparison 
of each of these as well as composite measures based on additive and multiplicative aggregation 
(see the online appendix), it became obvious that the relative ranking of the ten constituencies re-
mains essentially unchanged regardless of measure. In other words, it became clear that measuring 
the extent of clientelism was far less complicated than expected and not at all particularly depend-
ent on choice of measure. This in itself is a significant an important finding. It is true that indirect 
measures result in higher reported levels of clientelism than direct measures and thus studies using 
one or the other cannot be compared to each other.  But the pattern of reporting is consistent 
across different types of areas in Ghana at least, and hence, the differences between constituencies 
in terms of how widespread political clientelism remain stable regardless of measure.  
                                                     
6 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tocol derived from criminology in order to 
counteract tendencies of underreporting socially less acceptable practices. The initial questions purposely treat clien-
telism as something that would be normal, showing that the interviewer speaks about it openly. The initial questions ask 
what the respondent thinks about clientelism in general ? in this context Ghana ? with subsequent questions moving 
down to the constituency, the local area, people the respondent knows, family and friends, then the respondent. Select-
ing the five most direct of these questions as separate measures, and then calculating the average response rate indi-
cating clientelism was one way to calculate an index measure. The first question asks if the respondent perceives that 
???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
??????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the respondent personally knows more people who got something in clientelistic exchange in 2004, compared to 2000, 
and the third question is the answer to whether the respondent was engaged in a clientelistic exchange. To be precise, 
these questions indicate whether the respondent witnesses and is subject to attempts to establish clientelistic exchang-
es. We cannot tell whether each such attempt of a politician or his/her party worker to create political loyalty by distribu-
tion of personalized goods is successful or not. But assuming that some portion of attempts are successful and that this 
rate of success is relatively constant across these constituencies, measuring attempts to establish clientelistic relations 
should be a useful proxy for actual clientelism. Even so, we must be aware that the data are likely to overestimate the 
prevalence of successful clientelism. The final two questions, asked in August 2008, pertain to expectations about the 
prevalence of clientelism in the upcoming 2008 election campaign.  
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In the end, the analysis showed that the most intuitive measure of the extensiveness of political 
clientelism also performed the best in terms of capturing the overall variation between the different 
measures. The chosen measure combines the response rate of yes-answers to the question of 
whether the respondent knows anyone who was involved in political clientelism (i.e. measuring the 
extension of individuals indirectly observing clientelism) and multiplies it by the average number of 
???????????? ????? ???????????? ????? ????????????????????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????????
exchange involving the incumbent MP as patron. The resulting measure is an effective proxy for 
actual extension of clientelism in a particular constituency.  
  
Table 2 reports on the means and significant differences of means across the ten constituencies and 
provide the index score, as well as the rank order of the constituencies.7 The final column translates 
the rank ordering into three main categories: Low, medium, and high levels of clientelism. Again we 
                                                     
7 The rationale for using the rank order is that no matter how well justified these index scores may be, there is a sub-
stantial amount of uncertainty in the measures and the interval measures probably give an undue impression of preci-
sion. It would be intellectually dishonest to treat them as known entities that can be analyzed using methods such as 
regression analysis designed for precise measures. But we can be much more certain about the position of the constit-
uencies relative to each other (even if we know little about the distances between them), and therefore the relative 
ranking position is used as the main measure for the analysis. 
Table 2: Clientelism in selected constituencies 
    
Did You Personally 
Know Anyone Who 
Got 'Small Chops' in 
2004? 
How Many Did You 
Know That Got 'Small 
Chops' in 2004?  
(>100 set at 100) 
Clientelism 
Index** 
Clientelism 
Rank 
Clientelism 
Category 
Constituency Type "Yes" (Harmonic Mean)   (1 = least)  
Jaman  S   Intermediate   38%   4.44   1.69   1   Low 
Kwabre  East   Safe   33%   6.37   2.10   2   Low 
Ho  West   Safe   62%   3.5   2.17   3   Low 
Evalue-­Gwira   Intermediate   33%   7.01   2.31   4   Low 
Kpone/Kat   Intermediate   53%   4.9   2.60   5   Medium 
Akim  Swedru   Safe   51%   5.87   2.99   6   Medium 
Bolgatanga   Contested   50%   6.96   3.48   7   Medium 
Tamale  C   Intermediate   55%   8.58   4.72   8   High  
Ablekumah  S   Contested   50%   11.1   5.55   9   High  
Cape  Coast   Contested   69%   8.6   5.93   10   High  
   Total   49%   6.4   3.14        
 N 1,147 1,414 1,147   
   Chi2   F=58.308   F=5.33           
 p .000 .000       
**  Index  =  mean  of  how  many  known  to  have  gotten  'small  chops'  x  share  of  sample  who  knew  at  least  one  person  
Source:  Author?s  survey  data  2008              
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find both significant variation and the surprising fact that some politicians in Ghana actually are not 
engaging that much in clientelistic exchanges. In four out of the ten constituencies, the averages 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????o-
ry. But how does the picture look like if we put the findings from Table 1 and Table 2 together? 
 
Quality of governing: expected variation and puzzles 
Table 3 displays the results of measuring MPs performance from provision of collective goods that 
are part of a high quality of government, to pure clientelism proper which is an extreme part of 
favoritism and the opposite to high quality of government.  
At the top off the table we find four positive cases where incumbent MPs focus on the provision of 
collective and club goods for groups of citizens, while they then can afford, or just decide, to spend 
less time and money on private goods and clientelism. The four constituencies with a positive but 
expected relationship show an interesting pattern. First, two out of the three selected safe havens 
are found in this group suggesting that low levels of competition can relieve MPs from an absolute 
need to engage in private goods provision on a larger scale in order to get reelected.  
It may also be that these MPs are forced to spend so much on their primaries where it is de facto 
decided who will become MP, that they are simply forced to focus on the less expensive strategy of 
collective goods provision during the official election campaign. It may be exaggerated by the pres-
sure on them to mobilize (rather than persuade) party supporters to turn out in larger numbers on 
election day in order to strengthen the supp???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???a-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
candidate is guaranteed to win, so using limited resources on expensive clientelistic strategies in 
order to improve the vote return from say 76 to 82 percent should be considered waste. These 
resources will have much higher marginal utility if saved until the election season is over and can be 
invested in either small scale club goods for communities or private goods for individuals ? in both 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the constituents. So according to this reasoning, the candidate should spend as close as possible to 
zero on the official campaign.  
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
available for constituency service and also patronage, especially in poor African countries such as 
Ghana where state resources are decisive. This makes it rational for the candidate to use some per-
sonal funds in order to enhance the chances of the party winning or retaining executive power. Yet, 
the stakes will not be as high for a candidate in a safe haven as in a competitive constituency. Safe 
haven voters tend to be less elastic in their vote choice and more forgiving of the fact that their 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????m-
pared to voters in swing constituencies. In the end, candidates in safe havens are unlikely to face 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is defeated. 8 
It is different for candidates in contested constituencies, whose reelection is much more likely to be 
dependent on having the access to pork, patronage and resources for clientelistic networks that is 
provided by being the party in power. In the end, the outcomes, in terms of balancing and prioritiz-
ing between provision of collective and private goods and the level of clientelism in these constitu-
encies, are consistent with the expectations from the theory discussed above. Yet, correlation is not 
causation, as we know. In order to validate these claims about the causal mechanisms involved, we 
need to investigate at least one of these cases more closely by means of political ethnography. 
In any case, the empirical relationship corroborates expectations from the literature on clientelism 
and vote buying regarding the trade-off between different strategies. The logic is based on the as-
sumption that MPs have constraints on time and resources and need to prioritize. A strategy based 
on provision of collective and club goods would then necessitate less emphasis on provision of 
private goods and clientelistic relationships. Public goods take time for the legislator that detracts 
from the capacity to engage too much in direct private goods provision. In Ghana, the MPs not 
only lobby state ministries, agencies, and departments (MDAs) for development projects for their 
communities but also contribute financially directly for bore holes, school buildings materials, con-
struction of markets, scholarship schemes for gifted students to go on to secondary school, sanita-
                                                     
8 ??????????????????????????????????????????????? Bolgatanga, held by one of the small parties (PNC) ? is interesting. It 
??? ?? ?????????????????????????s hold on the seat is very tenuous. We would thus have predicted a higher level of 
spending on clientelism than we see. A likely explanation for the relatively lower levels of private goods provision and 
clientelism in this case is that small parties simply tend to be very poor. While it is possible for an MP from a small party 
to get some development projects approved by MDAs in exchange for loyalty when it comes to voting in the legislature, 
they do not have access to big party coffers, kick-backs from contracts, and other sources of income that can be used to 
sustain clientelistic networks. 
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tion projects, and so on. Some of the fund????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ????
Common Fund, the Ghana Education Trust fund, and in recent years debt relief from the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries agreement.9 But MPs routinely use large sums of their personal funds as 
well in order to meet demands for club goods of this nature. Hence, the more a legislator spends on 
public and club goods, the less time and resources will be left over to invest in private goods and 
clientelistic relationships. That is not to say that one should expect legislators to spend their time 
and money exclusively on collective and club goods. Most, if not all, of them can be expected to 
pursue mixed strategies and that is also what the data indicates. In all the ten constituencies ana-
lyzed here, incumbent MPs do just that and the differences reflect relative emphasis.  
Then follows four mixed or negative cases that more or less mirror the positive cases. There is an 
unexpected instance with one safe haven constituency (Akim Swedru) where the incumbent has 
engaged in more private goods provision and clientelism (although less pronounced in the latter 
case) than seems necessary given the safe haven nature. It is less strongly a safe haven than the 
other two, however, and that may explain the somewhat mixed picture in this case. Two others are 
hotly contested constituencies, which is exactly where we would expect a more pervasive clien-
telism. The last is a semi-contested constituency that has been targeted by the other party as one 
constituency they would try to take, hence a need for the incumbent to respond by increasing the 
amount of private goods and clientelism in order to make swing voters change their vote. The out-
come once again tallies with theoretical expectations. 
                                                     
9 The Common Fund consists of 7.5% of state revenues that are distributed to local governments in the 110 districts. 
Districts typically enclose two or three constituencies and an MPs in such a constituency have spending authority over a 
5% share for community development purposes. Currently, MPs can use the equivalent of about $34,000 annually from 
this source. In addition, when in the last few years Ghana became decla????????????????????????????????????????????
country), the same formula was applied generating another about $9,000 per year per MP for developmental projects in 
line with the HIPIC guidelines. In contrast with the expectations on MPs from constituents in general, and supporters in 
particular, these sums do not amount to much. See Lindberg 2009a. 
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We end with two real puzzles. For one constituency (Tamale Central), the results indicate that the 
MP is providing relatively high levels of everything across the board, and in the other (Evalue-
Gwira), it is the opposite ? the incumbent is apparently doing very little of anything. There may be 
purely idiosyncratic reasons for these two puzzles and, once again, there may be as yet uncovered 
but theoretically relevant reasons. The Tamale case is particularly interesting, however. The incum-
bent got reelected in the last elections and this raises several interesting issues. Why did the incum-
bent feel the need to pursue an across-the-board strategy? Has the incumbent found innovative 
ways of combining these strategies or even allowing for private goods provision to somehow assist 
in the provision of club and collective goods in the eyes of the citizens? These are questions that 
should be answered in the future using more in-depth data. 
Thus, in eight out the ten constituencies, we find more or less the expected pattern where incum-
bents who pursue a strategy more oriented towards provision of collective and club goods give 
Table 3: Categorical comparison    
  QoG                            ?                       Favoritism   
Constituency Type 
Collective 
Goods  
Club 
Goods  
Private 
Goods  Clientelism  
 
Outcome 
Ho  West   Safe   High   High   Medium Low      Positive  (Expected)  
Kwabre  East   Safe   High   Medium Medium Low      Positive  (Expected)  
Bolgatanga   Contested   High   High   High   Medium 
  
Positive  (Expected)  
Jaman  S   Intermediate   High   Medium Medium Low  
  
Positive  (Expected)  
Akim  Swedru   Safe   Medium Low   Low   Medium 
  
Mixed  (Unexpected)  
Ablekumah  S   Contested   Low   Medium Low   High  
  
Negative  (Expected)  
Kpone/Kat   Intermediate   Low   Low   Medium Medium 
  
Negative  (Expected)  
Cape  Coast   Contested   Low   Low   Low   High  
  
Negative  (Expected)  
Evalue-­Gwira   Intermediate   Low   Low   Low   Low  
  
Puzzle  1  
Tamale  C   Intermediate   High   High   High   High  
  
Puzzle  2  Note: For the first three types of goods (collective, club, and personal), white cells marked with ?High?indicate that the evaluation of the MP in that constituency is significantly better than a neutral response (themean of 2.0 indicates a neutral response, i.e. that the incumbent has done neither badly, nor well in theprovision of these goods). Cells with the text ?Medium? in bold indicate that the average response isstatistically indistinguishable from the neutral position, and grey cells with the text ?Low? indicates that it issignificantly lower or worse. Since the measure for clientelism does not have such easily identifiable anchorpoints, the division into categories have been created by inspecting the distribution in Table 2 and using areasonable judgment to find meaningful differences.
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much less emphasis to giving personal assistance and gifts and engaging in political clientelism, and 
the reverse. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the contours of a new empirical method of measuring political strategies 
employed by legislators in single-member district systems using survey data. It could in principle be 
replicated on a cross-national basis. Building on established theories of clientelistic politics and 
incentives created by differing level of competition in poor, new democracies, the analysis also 
shows significant variation in the quality of governing: Favoritism in the form of clientelism and the 
provision of private goods varies greatly. This variation, within one and the same country, is a find-
ing that runs contrary to much of the established literature on African politics, especially the finding 
that four out of ten (almost half) of the incumbent MPs prioritize collective and club goods, associ-
ated with more programmatic strategies that per definition are more impartial, in their activities as 
MPs seeking reelection. 
Facing the issue of provision of goods, whether in a principal-agent or a collective action situation, 
the MPs are exposed to pressures from both informal and formal institutions to which they re-
spond. MPs can act in good or bad ways so as to create reactions from groups, change expectations 
among them, and thus at least in part shape the pressures to which they are subjected in the future. 
While idiosyncratic actions by individual MPs can be just that, it is also reasonable to consider their 
behavior to be in part a response to a set of incentives, disincentives, and norms that can be sys-
tematically assessed. A first step in this process is to measure how MPs actually behave ? how they 
govern not only in the legislature or at party headquarters but also and perhaps more importantly, 
at the local level in the eyes of their constituents. 
The informal side of the MP-citizens relationship in Ghana has a significant potential for making 
the agent (MP) act in accordance with the interests of the principal (citizens) to make them more 
impartial. For example, office holders feel the need to speak on the floor of the House and bring 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to do so. With increased information and civic education, this could potentially be a tool of effectu-
ating democratic responsiveness, furthering programmatic platforms that lead to a greater provision 
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of collective and public goods, and making policy better adapted to the needs of constituents.  If 
legislators are pressured to spend more of their time, energy and scarce resources on such collective 
goods this creates greater (by no means perfect!) impartiality. Since resources for legisltors are typi-
cally extremely scarce, this may lead to a double gain since they will be forced to reduce the equiva-
lent sum of time and resources spent on favoritistic strategies.  
Similarly, that office holders are also held to task for community development efforts and the in-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
role in making it a primary concern of MPs to bring local development to their communities.  
While such goods are far removed from pur public goods, they are at least impartial with respect to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??rtial or not, 
they are typically more or less impartial and club goods are more impartial than pure private goods 
and clientelistic exchanges. 
Based on explorative fieldwork Lindberg (2009b, 2010) found examples of how the office of the 
MP in Ghana had developed a distinct hybrid character consisting of a combination of the fairly 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s (e.g. roof-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
and has also brought into play traditional tools of shame, collective punishment of the family, and 
loss of prestige and status as methods of sanction. In this sense, the accountability relationship 
between MP (agent) and citizens (principal) is in many ways even stronger than standard democrat-
ic theory would have us to believe.  This is just to point out the possibility of achieving better quali-
ty of government as impartiality by what we may consider unconventional means in various set-
tings. The principle of impartiality as the meaning of quality of government may be best conceptu-
alized as a universal norm (Rothstein 2011;; see also the first chapter of this volume), but the means 
to achieve it may differ greatly.  
???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? impli-
cations of this accountability and that voters in this African country do evaluate their political lead-
ers not only on personal and clientelistic goods but also on provision of small and large-scale col-
lective goods. In effect and without necessarily thinking of it this way, citizens in Ghana are de-
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manding greater impartiality not only from the bureaucracy in its implementation of public policy, 
but also from legislators and they use the electoral mechanism to achieve it. MPs in Ghana clearly 
differ in how much they provide quality of government as impartiality. It is also clear that voters in 
this country see the difference and put some value on impartially provided goods. To what extent 
pressures from voters will induce politicians in new democracies such as Ghana to further increase 
the quality of government rather than the provision of partially distributed personal and clientelistic 
goods remains to be established by future research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Three constituencies reflecting safe-havens for the two dominant parties in their geographical 
strongholds Ashanti region for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and Volta region for the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) respectively were chosen. Ho West in the Volta Region, a stronghold 
of the NDC, was split in two for the 2004 election so in the second round, both these constituen-
cies were sampled to ensure consistency over time. Kwabre, in the heartland of the Ashanti region, 
on the other hand, is considered a National Patriotic Party (NPP) stronghold.  Akim Swedru in the 
Eastern region is another safe haven chosen to capture that region but also to reflect the fact that 
the NPP have almost double the number of safe havens compared to the NDC. Besides being safe 
havens, each of these constituencies has a diverse population of urban and rural residents engaged 
in trading, farming and education. These three were selected because they were very representative 
of the regions (c.f. Lindberg and Morrison 2005). Next, three competitive districts, in which the 
two dominant parties were equally competitive, as neither had a clear majority or power had alter-
nated between them, were also selected. The Central region and the Greater Accra region have 
been contested regions for both parties in several elections. Both Cape Coast and Ablekumah 
South had been an NPP constituency over the last three election cycles but with radically decreas-
ing margins and both were eventually lost to the NDC in 2008. Both have a combination of fishing, 
farming, trading, and small-scale cottage industry communities, and a mixture of urban and rural 
communities. Ablekumah South is also one of the most populous constituencies in the country and 
provide a fairly good cross-section of residents in the capital. The last competitive area was Bolga-
tanga in the far north of the country. In addition to contributing to geographical representation of 
the country and inclusion of some minority ethnic groups from the North, it is a constituency 
where one of the small parties has won a seat in the past. During the time of the survey, the PNC 
was holding the seat although it was lost to the NDC in the 2008 election. In addition to the six 
constituencies above, four semi-competitive constituencies were selected. Kpone-Katamanso lies 
on the outskirts of the Accra/Tema metropolitan area with a mixed population of various occupa-
tions ranging from farmers to traders and citizens who work in the city but live outside is a more 
rural community compared to Ablekumah South constituency. Evalue-Gwira is located in the 
Western region and a traditional strong-hold of the CPP, which is the party with the strongest his-
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????m-
petitive over the years. Jaman South is located in Brong-Afaho region and while somewhat compet-
itive, is still relatively safe for the NPP. Tamale Central constituency in the Northern region is also 
relatively competitive but has been comfortably won by the NDC. 
Once the ten constituencies were, a random sample of potential voters (everyone above the age of 
18) was drawn using a two-stage procedure following the Afrobarometer Survey Methods (2009). 
First, a random selection of 16 electoral areas was drawn from the polling station register (with 
distance rule applied to ensure geographical spread within each constituency). The final stages of 
sampling were guided by Afrobarometer protocol where surveyors identify an interval of house-
holds to survey (survey every nth household determined by the day of the month) and within the 
household, random selection of respondent from a assembled list of members in the household 
above the age of 18. 
 
 
